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AMBRO, 
 
Circuit Judge 
This case involves principally the interpretation of a 
construction subcontract.  A dispute arose when a general 
contractor, Shoemaker Construction Company 
(“Shoemaker”), failed to pay a subcontractor, Sloan & 
Company (“Sloan”), the remaining balance on its subcontract.  
The appellant in this case, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Liberty Mutual”), is the surety on the subcontract 
and the party Sloan has sued for payment on the surety bond.  
Sloan cross-appeals with respect to one aspect of its claim.  
For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion as to Liberty 
Mutual’s appeal, and affirm the ruling on Sloan’s cross-
appeal. 
I.  Background 
Isla of Capri Associates LP (“IOC”) owned and 
developed waterfront condominiums in Philadelphia.  
Shoemaker contracted with IOC to build the project (the 
“prime contract”).  Shoemaker then lined up various 
subcontractors that included Sloan, who agreed to perform 
drywall and carpentry work on the project (the 
“subcontract”).  Payment for the subcontractors’ work was 
insured by a surety bond issued by Liberty Mutual.  At the 
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project’s completion, IOC refused to pay Shoemaker nearly 
$6.5 million owed under the prime contract.  Of that amount, 
$5 million was due the subcontractors.  IOC claimed it was 
withholding money for several reasons, one of which was that 
some of the subcontractors’ work was untimely and 
deficient.1
 In May 2007, Shoemaker sued IOC to recover the 
balance on the prime contract.  Sloan then made a claim 
against Liberty Mutual for payment on the surety bond.  Five 
weeks later, Liberty Mutual denied the claim in its entirety, 
reserving all rights and defenses.  As a ground for denying 
any payment obligation to Sloan, Liberty Mutual asserted that 
one of the subcontract’s terms, found in Paragraph 6.f, 
conditioned Sloan’s right to payment on Shoemaker’s receipt 
of payment from IOC.  Relying on that interpretation of the 
subcontract, Liberty Mutual claimed that Sloan was not 
entitled to payment from Shoemaker because IOC had not 
paid Shoemaker.    
  Shoemaker then refused to pay Sloan the full 
amount of the remaining balance Sloan claimed was due 
under their subcontract—$1,074,260.   
 In December 2007, Sloan filed a complaint against 
Liberty Mutual in the District Court.  Sloan moved for 
summary judgment in the amount of $1,074,260.09, plus 
interest and taxable costs.  Liberty Mutual cross-motioned for 
summary judgment.  It argued that even if Sloan were entitled 
to payment, the amount at most was $785,067 because of 
                                              
1 IOC deducted $418,392 from Sloan’s claim for payment 
because it identified Sloan as one of the subcontractors who 
were “bad actors.”  A1018. 
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various offsets.  Sloan’s claim, and Liberty Mutual’s alleged 
offsets, broke down as follows: 
   Sloan’s  Liberty  Undisputed 
   Claim  Mutual’s   Amount in 
     Alleged Offsets Controversy 
 $1,074,260   
Legal fees 
(attributable to 
Sloan) 
 $16,5792   
Repairs  $40,370  
Deficiencies  $24,600  
Time & 
Materials 
Provided 
 $66,324  
Lump Sum 
Proposals 
Performed 
 $141,320  
Subtotal of 
offsets claimed 
 $289, 193  
   $785,067 
 
                                              
2 In its second cross-motion for summary judgment, Liberty 
Mutual claimed that this amount was much higher.   
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Meanwhile, Shoemaker’s lawsuit against IOC hit a 
dead end.  Shoemaker learned that IOC’s financial situation 
made it unable to satisfy a judgment for the entire claim even 
if one were awarded to Shoemaker.  It entered into a 
settlement agreement with IOC for $1 million, apparently all 
that IOC was able to pay.3  Shoemaker offered its 
subcontractors their pro rata share of amounts owed in 
exchange for a release of claims, but Sloan did not agree to 
that arrangement and continued to press its suit against 
Liberty Mutual.4
In August 2009, the District Court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Sloan for $785,067 (the “First 
Judgment”).  It rejected Liberty Mutual’s interpretation of the 
subcontract as conditioning Sloan’s right to payment on 
IOC’s payment to Shoemaker.  The Court allowed the parties 
to conduct additional discovery as to whether Sloan was 
entitled to any additional amounts.  
   
                                              
3 Liberty Mutual represented that Shoemaker had spent over 
$3 million pursuing payment from IOC and, at the time of 
oral argument, IOC had paid only $300,000 of the agreed 
settlement.   
 
4  Prior to this, Liberty Mutual had moved for a dismissal or 
stay of Sloan’s suit based on a provision of the subcontract in 
which Sloan “agree[d] to [wait to] pursue its claim against the 
Contractor or its surety until the Contractor Dispute 
Resolution and all appeals thereto are completed and become 
final.”  On information that Shoemaker’s case was settled, 
Sloan moved to lift the stay and for entry of summary 
judgment.   
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After discovery, the parties again moved for summary 
judgment.  The Court granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of Sloan on the issue of legal fees and deficiencies, and 
awarded prejudgment interest (on that amount as well as on 
the previous sum awarded—$785,067), for an additional sum 
aggregating $145,895 (the “Second Judgment”).5
In lieu of trial on the remaining amounts, the parties 
stipulated to the entry of a third and final judgment in favor of 
Sloan on February 12, 2010 (the “Final Judgment”).  Included 
within the Final Judgment were sums set forth in the First 
Judgment, the Second Judgment, and the additional amount 
of  $179,876 ($156,224, plus prejudgment interest of 
$23,652).
   
6
The parties agreed to preserve their rights to appeal all 
three of the District Court’s judgments, and Liberty Mutual 
does so, challenging the District Court’s interpretation of the 
subcontract.  It argues that Shoemaker’s obligation to pay 
  The combined amounts in the Final Judgment 
(excluding interest) were $91,790 less than Sloan’s initial 
claim of $1,074,260.   
                                              
5  The principal amount of this judgment was $41,179. 
 
6  The Final Judgment dealt with the remaining amounts in 
dispute.  Per the parties’ stipulation, that judgment deducted 
nothing for repairs, $11,430 for time and materials provided, 
and $80,361 for lump sum proposals performed.  We take 
from the parties’ briefs that only the propriety of these 
deductions is challenged, but not their amounts.  Therefore, 
we address only whether Liberty Mutual was entitled to argue 
for these deductions. 
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Sloan was conditioned on its receipt of payment from IOC, 
or, put another way, Sloan was entitled to be paid only 
whatever amount Shoemaker received from IOC for Sloan’s 
work.  Liberty Mutual also contests the District Court’s 
determination on litigation costs.  It argues it is entitled to 
deduct Sloan’s share of the legal fees stemming from 
Shoemaker’s suit against IOC.  In addition, Sloan cross-
appeals the $91,790 shortfall from its initial claim. It argues 
that Liberty Mutual waived the right to claim offsets by 
failing to state their bases within 45 days of Sloan’s initial 
claim.7
II.  Discussion  
 
Summary judgment is in order when “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to  judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  Our review over the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 
299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008).  We also exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s interpretation of state law.  Emerson 
Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 253 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
A.   The Contract   
The crux of the dispute is Paragraph 6.f of the 
subcontract, which deals with final payment.  Thus, to resolve 
                                              
7  The District Court had jurisdiction based on the diversity of 
the parties’ citizenship.  28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s rulings under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
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the dispute, we begin by considering in detail the language 
and structure of that provision.   
It contains two subparagraphs.  The first provides in 
relevant part: “Final payment shall be made within thirty (30) 
days after the last of the following to occur, the occurrence of 
all of which shall be conditions precedent to such final 
payment . . . .”  That subparagraph then lists those conditions 
precedent (seven in all), one of which (condition three) is that 
“[IOC] shall have accepted the Work and made final payment 
thereunder to [Shoemaker]” (emphasis added).  Another 
(condition six) is that “[Shoemaker] shall have received final 
payment from [IOC] for [Sloan’s] Work” (emphasis added).   
Liberty Mutual argues that these conditions constitute 
a “pay-if-paid” clause.   In construction contract parlance, this 
means that a subcontractor gets paid by the general contractor 
only if the owner pays the general contractor for that 
subcontractor’s work.  Pennsylvania courts follow suit, and 
construe clauses that condition payment to the subcontractor 
on the general contractor’s receipt of payment from the owner 
as pay-if-paid clauses.8
Sloan, on the other hand, argues that the first 
subparagraph of 6.f does not establish a condition precedent 
to Sloan’s payment, but rather is a “pay-when-paid” clause.  
On the surface, these terms seem much the same (save, 
perhaps, that paying if paid does not tell us when that 
   See, e.g., C.M. Eichenlaub Co., Inc. 
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 437 A.2d 965, 967 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1981); Cumberland Bridge Co. v. Lastooka, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 
475, 482 (C.P. Washington 1977).   
                                              
8 It is undisputed  that Pennsylvania law applies. 
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payment is due).  But in industry jargon, they are different.  In 
contrast to a pay-if-paid clause, a pay-when-paid clause does 
not establish a condition precedent, but merely creates a 
timing mechanism for the general contractor’s payment to the 
subcontractor.  See, e.g., United Plate Glass Co. Div. of 
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Metal Trims Indus., Inc., 525 A.2d 
468, 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).   
To support its pay-when-paid interpretation, Sloan 
points to the second subparagraph of 6.f, which describes a 
process by which it may sue Shoemaker for final payment in 
the event that IOC fails to make final payment to Shoemaker.  
The language of that subparagraph states:   
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this 
Paragraph 6.f, if within six months of the date 
that final payment is due to [Shoemaker by 
IOC], [Sloan] has not received final payment 
for its Work, [Sloan] may pursue its claim 
against [Shoemaker] and its Surety [Liberty 
Mutual] for final payment as follows:  
If within six months of the date that final 
payment is due and payable to [Shoemaker], 
[Shoemaker] commences a legal proceedings 
against [IOC] . . . (the “Contractor Dispute 
Resolution”) to resolve its own claim for final 
payment, [Sloan] agrees not to pursue its claim 
against [Shoemaker] or [Liberty Mutual] until 
the Contractor Dispute Resolution and all 
appeals thereto are completed and become final 
. . . . 
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Upon completion of the Contractor Dispute 
Resolution . . . , [Sloan] may pursue any 
remaining claim for final payment it may have 
against [Shoemaker] or its Surety.  
Notably, that subparagraph concludes by stating that 
[n]othing in Paragraph 6.f is intended to modify 
the provisions of Paragraph 20[, which deals 
with dispute resolution,] under the Subcontract . 
. . . 
We consider each subparagraph in turn and their combined 
effect on the meaning of the contract.  
 Pennsylvania follows the plain meaning rule of 
contract interpretation, such that “[w]hen a written contract is 
clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its 
contents alone.  It speaks for itself and a meaning cannot be 
given to it other than that expressed.”  Steuart v. McChesney, 
444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Accordingly, the cases recognize that 
express language of condition is sufficient to establish a pay-
if-paid condition precedent.  In C.M. Eichenlaub Co., for 
example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court viewed as a 
condition precedent to payment a clause that stated the 
builder “shall be under no obligation to make any payments 
to contractor . . . for materials delivered or for work 
performed by contractor unless and until Builder is first paid 
for such materials and work by the owner.”  437 A.2d at 967;  
see also Cumberland Bridge Co., 8 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 479-80 
(same).  When certainty is lacking, however, Pennsylvania 
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courts tend to interpret payment provisions as pay-when-paid 
clauses.  See, e.g., United Plate Glass Co., 525 A.2d at 470.   
 But that is not our case.  The first subparagraph of 6.f 
states unequivocally that IOC’s payment to Shoemaker is a 
condition precedent to Shoemaker’s obligation to pay Sloan.  
We do not imagine that the parties intended otherwise merely 
because they did not use additional language to underscore 
their intent to create a pay-if-paid clause, as Sloan argues.  To 
mandate redundant provisions conjures the consequence that 
only repetition makes a provision pay-if-paid.  Moreover, we 
agree that courts should not interpret contracts in a way that 
“render[s] at least one clause superfluous or meaningless.”  
Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 
1988).  Thus, we are satisfied that the parties’ chosen 
language is sufficient to create a pay-if-paid clause in the first 
subparagraph of 6.f.   
 The opposite conclusion would lead to bizarre results.  
If Sloan failed to complete its work, per condition one, could 
it then argue that it was still entitled to final payment under 
the subcontract?  We can see no principled reason to treat 
differently conditions three and six (no payment to Sloan until 
Shoemaker has received “final” payment from IOC).  That 
seven conditions were enumerated in this provision, and 
expressly delineated conditions precedents, weigh in favor of 
a pay-if-paid construction.  In the face of this plain language, 
we shall not infer a contrary intent.9
                                              
9 A leading construction law treatise suggests that there is 
nothing inherently unfair about a pay-if-paid clause that 
operates to shift risk of non-payment by the owner to the 
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 However, that is not the end of the story.  The parties 
created an override provision in the second subparagraph of 
6.f that modifies the pay-if-paid clause of the first 
subparagraph.  Specifically, the language of the second 
subparagraph, noted above, demonstrates that the contracting 
parties intended Sloan to have a “claim” against Shoemaker 
for “any remaining final payment” in certain instances—
specifically, in the event that IOC failed to make final 
payment (defined as the entire unpaid balance on the prime 
contract) within six months.     
 A modification of a pay-if-paid condition is a not 
uncommon practice in the construction industry.  See The 
                                                                                                     
subcontractor.  This interpretation is favored where there is 
“clear and unequivocal language set forth unambiguously on 
the face of the contract.”  For example, “the subcontractor 
should not be entitled to payment if a payment clause 
specifically states that (1) payment to the contractor is a 
condition precedent to payment to the subcontractor; or (2) 
the subcontractor is to bear the risk of the owner’s 
insolvency; or (3) the subcontractor is to be paid exclusively 
out of a fund the sole source of which is the owner's payment 
to the subcontractor.”  2-7 Construction Law P 7.04 (Matthew 
Bender ed., 2011).  In our case, the first factor is clearly met.  
Arguably, the third factor is also met given that the third 
condition precedent in the first subparagraph of 6.f requires 
that “Owner [IOC] shall have accepted the Work and made 
final payment thereunder to Contractor [Shoemaker].”  By 
implication, the money used to make final payment to the 
subcontractor comes directly from the final payment made to 
the contractor.   
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Construction Contracts Book 160-63 (Daniel S. Brennan et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).  There are several ways to modify pay-
if-paid clauses.  Particularly “[i]n states that distinguish 
between the two [i.e., pay-if-paid and pay-when-paid 
provisions], an obvious way to modify a pay-if-paid clause is 
to convert it to a pay-when-paid clause.  This is accomplished 
by eliminating the condition precedent after a contractually 
stated period of time.”  Id. at 162.  Though we do not know 
for certain, we can imagine several reasons why the parties 
here—both sophisticated players—might have contracted for 
such a modification.  For one, “pragmatic contractor[s]” 
understand subcontractors’ reluctance to agree to an absolute 
pay-if-paid clause and are thus sometimes amenable to some 
form of modification or ‘softening’ of the condition 
precedent.  See id. at 160.  Alternatively, Shoemaker may 
have anticipated that Sloan would sue for payment if IOC 
defaulted, notwithstanding the pay-if-paid clause.  The second 
part of Paragraph 6.f is a way to control the timing and extent 
of Sloan’s legal action in that scenario.   
In any event, the pay-if-paid condition, as modified, 
yields after six months of IOC non-payment and is replaced 
with a timing mechanism that specifies when and for how 
much Sloan may sue Shoemaker.   Specifically, that timing 
mechanism allows Sloan to “pursue any remaining claim for 
final payment.”  It requires Sloan to wait to “pursue” its 
“claim” until Shoemaker has had an opportunity to recover 
what it can from IOC.  Accordingly, because IOC has failed 
to pay for over six months and Shoemaker’s suit against IOC 
for payment has concluded, Sloan is entitled to “pursue any 
remaining claim for final payment.”  
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 That conclusion leads to another issue:  how to define 
“any remaining claim for final payment.”  The structure of 
Paragraph 6.f demonstrates that the parties did not intend for 
Sloan’s “remaining claim for final payment” to equal the 
entire unpaid balance on the subcontract.  Such a construction 
would essentially nullify the first subparagraph:  whether IOC 
made, and Shoemaker received, final payment on the prime 
contract would be irrelevant if, in cases of IOC non-payment, 
Sloan was always entitled to the entire unpaid balance on the 
subcontract.   
 To understand what the parties intended by the phrase 
“remaining claim for final payment,” we must read Paragraph 
6.f in connection with Paragraph 20, for, as noted, the former 
is subject to the latter.  Paragraph 20’s provisions on “dispute 
resolution” reads in relevant part: 
In the event [Sloan] asserts a claim for payment 
of the Subcontract Sum or a portion thereof . . . 
and in the event that [Shoemaker] in its sole, 
exclusive and arbitrary discretion submits said . 
. . Claim to [IOC] . . . for a decision or 
determination, then all decisions and 
determinations made by [IOC] or its 
representative shall be binding upon [Sloan] 
even though [Sloan] may not be a party thereto . 
. . . 
The decision or determination of [IOC] or its 
representative making the first and/or original 
decision shall be final and conclusive on 
[Sloan] except to the extent that [Shoemaker] 
may in its sole, exclusive and arbitrary 
16 
 
discretion . . . appeal to other representatives of 
[IOC] or commence a proceeding in Court or 
arbitration or other dispute resolution forum 
. . . .    
Then, in such event, [Sloan] agrees to be bound 
to [Shoemaker] to the same extent [Shoemaker] 
is bound to [IOC] by any final decisions of said 
other representative of [IOC] or of a Court of 
competent jurisdiction or by any final or interim 
award issued in arbitration or by any final 
decisions issued in any other dispute resolution 
forum . . . . 
This provision, also common in construction contracts, 
provides a procedural mechanism for pass-through claims—a 
process by which a general contractor may assert the claims 
of its subcontractors against an owner.  This mechanism is 
known as a “liquidating agreement.”10
                                              
10 “Liquidating agreements” in construction contracts are not 
the same as “liquidated” in the liquidated damages sense (the 
latter converting damages for a legal injury to a sum certain in 
cash, see A.G. Cullen Const., Inc. v. State Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 898 A.2d 1145, 1161-62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) 
(noting that liquidated damages “denotes the sum a party to a 
contract agrees to pay if he breaks some [contractual] 
promise”)).  Liquidating agreements are the mechanism by 
which pass-through claims are asserted and they can, 
depending on how they are drafted, “liquidate” damages (so 
to speak) to the amount that the contractor has recovered from 
the owner.  They range in complexity and detail, depending 
on the drafting.  In any event, we do not suggest that a 
  See E. Elec. Corp. v. 
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Shoemaker Const. Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (acknowledging as a liquidating agreement language 
that mirrors that in our case, namely, that the  “Subcontractor 
agrees to be bound to the Contractor to the same extent the 
Contractor is bound to the Owner by any final decisions of 
[Owner’s representative] or of a Court of competent 
jurisdiction . . .[,] whether or not Subcontractor is a party to 
such proceedings” (alterations in original)).  One reason for 
including this mechanism in subcontracts is to give the 
subcontractor some means of redress against the owner in 
situations where it would otherwise have none because it 
lacks privity of contract with the owner.  Thomas J. Kelleher, 
Jr., Brian G. Corgan & William E. Dorris, Construction 
Disputes: Practice Guide with Forms 904 (2d ed. 2002). 
 Sloan argues that Paragraph 20 does not apply to this 
case because its only purpose is to resolve disputes between 
the subcontractor and the general contractor over whether a 
particular payment is owed and was not intended to resolve 
disputes over final payment.  We disagree.   
 Sloan’s narrow interpretation of Paragraph 20 is 
unlikely.  It seems strange that Sloan would have negotiated 
for a liquidating provision that is limited in the way it 
suggests, as it would be of little worth to Sloan:  without the 
ability to press a claim for final payment through Shoemaker 
against IOC, Sloan would have no other remedy against IOC 
in situations of IOC’s default.  Moreover, the language of 
Paragraph 6.f belies Sloan’s limited interpretation of 
                                                                                                     
liquidating agreement is the same thing as a liquidated 
damages provision. 
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Paragraph 20.  The former provision is explicit that if 
Shoemaker pursues “its own claim for final payment,” that 
claim “may or may not include claims of the Subcontractor.”   
 Shoemaker, Sloan argues, was not pursuing any of its 
(Sloan’s) claims in any event.  We do not accept that 
Shoemaker was asserting its own claims wholly independent 
of Sloan’s.  As a practical matter, there is no meaningful 
distinction between a suit brought to pay Shoemaker’s 
invoices (which include those of its subcontractors) and a suit 
brought nominally as a claim for its subcontractors’ 
payments.   In any event, Shoemaker made a claim of $6.5 
million against IOC, $5 million of which was for the 
exclusive benefit of its subcontractors.  It intends to pass all 
funds received from the settlement through to its 
subcontractors on a proportional basis.  In these 
circumstances, that Shoemaker did not specifically name 
Sloan in Shoemaker’s complaint against IOC is of no 
consequence.  We conclude that Paragraph 20 applies in this 
case, and now turn to how this affects the nature and extent of 
Sloan’s “remaining claim for final payment.”   
 Liquidating agreements that enable pass-through 
claims, such as the one in the contract before us, can also 
serve to limit the subcontractor’s damages to the amount the 
contractor recovers from the owner.  See Carl A. Calvert & 
Carl F. Ingwalson, Jr., Pass Through Claims and Liquidation 
Agreements, Constr. Lawyer, Oct. 1998, at 32, 33.  Here, the 
subcontract stated that “all decisions and determinations made 
by [IOC]” in connection with a passed-through claim would 
be “binding upon [Sloan] even though [Sloan] may not be a 
party thereto.”   
19 
 
 This language in Paragraph 20 is repeated in the 
second subparagraph of 6.f, the very provision that 
establishes that Sloan has a “claim” in the event of IOC non-
payment.  There, the parties agreed that nothing in that 
Paragraph modifies Paragraph 20, “including[,] without 
limitation, the provisions by which [Sloan] shall be bound to 
the decision and/or determination of [IOC], its representatives 
or a court or other fact finding dispute resolution forum[,] 
concerning the claims of [Sloan].”  In contract-speak, this is a 
“super-override.”  As Sloan is a sophisticated contracting 
party, we cannot believe it did not understand the import of 
this language that it agreed to twice.  We thus conclude that 
Paragraphs 20 and 6.f create a mechanism for passing through 
Sloan’s remaining claims for final payment and peg Sloan’s 
recovery to the amount that Shoemaker receives from IOC for 
Sloan’s work.    
 We believe that this outcome is consistent with the 
way in which the parties chose to allocate the risk of IOC 
non-payment.  As a general matter, industry custom places 
the risk of an owner’s insolvency on the general contractor.  
See, e.g., Thos. J. Dyer Co. v. Bishop Int’l Eng’g Co., 303 
F.2d 655, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1962).  But it is also industry 
custom that “various legal and contractual provisions . . . are 
used to reduce this [risk] to a minimum,” and that “express 
condition[s] clearly showing that to be the intention of the 
parties” may “transfer this normal credit risk incurred by the 
general contractor from the general contractor to the 
subcontractor.”  Id. at 660-61.  A way to do this is to put in 
the contract a pay-if-paid provision, as it is “meant to shift the 
risk of the owner’s nonpayment under the subcontract from 
the contractor to the subcontractor.”  Fixture Specialists, Inc. 
v. Global Const., LLC, No. 07-5614, 2009 WL 904031, at *4 
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(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009) (quoting MidAm. Const. Mgmt. Co. v. 
Mastec N. Am., Inc., 436 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2006)).  Such 
risk-shifting devices are easy to understand:  “[f]ew 
contractors can financially absorb a major default in payment 
by an owner in connection with a large construction project.  
In the absence of an enforceable pay-if-paid clause, if the 
owner defaults, the likely result would be an insolvent or 
bankrupt contractor.”  Construction Contracts Book, supra, at 
158.   
 In this case, however, we believe the parties intended, 
per the second part of Paragraph 6.f, to share the risk of 
IOC’s non-payment.  Shoemaker will bear its share of the loss 
by distributing all of the settlement proceeds pro rata to its 
subcontractors and keeping nothing for itself.  But under the 
District Court’s analysis, Shoemaker would bear all of the 
loss and Sloan none.  It would also force the other 
subcontractors to shoulder a disproportionate amount of loss:  
if Shoemaker is forced to pay Sloan the full balance, the 
others might get nothing and certainly less than their pro rata 
share.  We do not believe Shoemaker and Sloan intended such 
an outcome when they drafted the subcontract and we shall 
not redistribute risk and loss in such a counterintuitive way 
absent clear language to that effect.  As such, Sloan must bear 
its share of IOC’s failure to pay by accepting only a pro rata 
share of the recovery by Shoemaker rather than the full 
balance on its subcontract.11
                                              
11 Sloan complains that the situation is contrary to 
Pennsylvania’s public policy because, to procure the 
subcontract, it was required to waive its mechanic’s lien 
(which is a legal interest in the property held by those who 
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 In addition, we do not favor an interpretation that 
discourages contractors from vigorously pursuing owners for 
sums due to subcontractors.  Shoemaker purportedly spent 
over $3 million in order to get back a $1 million settlement, 
of which we understand only $300,000 has been paid.  It has 
stated that it will pass through all sums recovered subject to 
the parties sharing pro rata in all expenses and costs.  Were 
we to interpret the subcontract to give Sloan the entire 
balance on the subcontract, contractors in the future would be 
very reluctant to expend such substantial costs for the 
exclusive benefit of their subcontractors.   
 Finally, our interpretation is consistent with the 
industry custom and usage surrounding liquidating 
agreements, which is to “provide a means to simplify the 
pursuit of pass through claims while preserving working 
relationships and reducing costs,” and the industry’s 
understanding that “the major reason for negotiating 
liquidation agreements is to bring the claim against the 
                                                                                                     
provide unpaid labor or materials to build or improve the 
property, see Halowich v. Amminiti, 154 A.2d 406, 407 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1959)), and was given the surety bond instead.  It 
cites to state law that conditions the validity of a mechanic’s 
lien waiver on posting a surety bond.  49 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1401(a)(2)(ii) (West 2007).  However, this amendment to 
Pennsylvania law came into effect after Sloan bid for and 
accepted the subcontract.  Without relying on that policy, 
Sloan freely accepted the tradeoff between a mechanic’s lien 
and a surety bond.  In this context, we do not believe that 
enforcing the contract as written and intended by the parties is 
contrary to public policy.          
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responsible party”—here the owner, IOC.  Calvert & 
Ingwalson, supra, at 37. 
As Shoemaker’s suit against IOC qualified as a “pass-
through” claim of all its subcontractors, and IOC’s decision to 
settle was a qualifying “determination” by it (the outcome of 
which now binds Sloan), Sloan’s claim against Shoemaker is 
limited to its pro rata share of the settlement proceeds.12
B.   Legal fees 
  
 Liberty Mutual also argues that it was entitled to 
deduct (or offset) from Sloan’s recovery the latter’s share of 
Shoemaker’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in 
the suit against IOC.  Before we deal with the merits of this 
issue, we note that Sloan cross-appeals the District Court’s 
decision to allow Liberty Mutual’s offset claims to proceed, 
arguing they were not raised within 45 days of Sloan’s initial 
claim.  Thus we deal with the cross-appeal at the outset.  
  The bond required that Liberty Mutual raise all 
disputes with Sloan’s claim within 45 days.  As noted, 
Liberty Mutual generally denied Sloan’s entire claim within 
35 days, but rather than explaining the various offsets it 
planned to claim, it simply reserved its rights and defenses.  
Sloan argued to the District Court that Liberty Mutual was 
                                              
12 Because we decide on the basis of the parties’ express 
agreement that Sloan is entitled only to its pro rata share of 
the settlement amount, we need not determine whether the 
Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, 73 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 507 (West 2006), provides an additional basis 
for imposing a pay-if-paid condition on the subcontract. 
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required to state the exact amount it disputed, including the 
offsets for “time and materials provided,” “lump sum 
proposals performed,” and legal fees.  The District Court 
rejected that argument and held that Liberty Mutual’s 
response met its obligations under Paragraph 6.1 of the 
bond.13
Sloan relies on three cases to support its waiver 
argument.  The first is National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Bramble, Inc., 879 A.2d 101 (Md. 2005).  But there the surety 
did not refute the subcontractor’s claim at all; it merely 
acknowledged receipt of the subcontractor’s letter and 
requested proof of the claim.  The other two cases relate 
tenuously at best, as neither is precedential.  See J.C. Gibson 
Plastering Co. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 521 F. Supp. 2d 1326 
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (vacated with instructions that it shall not be 
cited or serve as precedent and modified to make exception 
for facts not reasonably available in the 45-day period); Casey 
Indus., Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., No. 1:06cv249, 2006 WL 
3299932 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2006) (unpublished decision 
holding that the surety was precluded from developing new 
bases for dispute outside the 45-day period).   
  We agree. 
In any event, it is clear to us that Sloan’s argument 
runs contrary to standard industry practice.  The Surety & 
Fidelity Association of America explains in its amicus brief 
that in recent revisions of the standard payment bond form, 
                                              
13 Paragraph 6.1 required Liberty Mutual to answer Sloan 
within 45 days of its receipt of Sloan’s claim, stating, inter 
alia, the bases for challenging any disputed amounts of that 
claim.    
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the industry chose language to clarify that Paragraph 6 does 
not put sureties at risk of waiving claims to specific offsets.  
Brief for Surety & Fidelity Assoc. of Am. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellants, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Nos. 10-
1725 & 10-1765, at 15-17.  The revised form clarifies that a 
surety’s failure to discharge obligations under Paragraphs 6.1 
or 6.2 “shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of 
defenses.”   
Once again, the consequences of Sloan’s interpretation 
are untenable.  Its construction would essentially require a 
surety to state every reason or contention it has or may later 
have in connection with a general denial of the claim lest it be 
precluded from asserting those defenses in the future.14
Turning now to the merits, Paragraph 20 of the 
subcontract states that “[i]f [Sloan]’s claims are prosecuted or 
defended by [Shoemaker] against [IOC] or others, then 
[Sloan] agrees . . . to pay or reimburse [Shoemaker] for all 
expenses and costs, if any, incurred in connection therewith.”  
As discussed, we believe Paragraph 20 applies to this case 
and Shoemaker asserted a pass-through claim on behalf of 
  We 
believe that Liberty Mutual’s response to Sloan met the 
requirements of the bond as those requirements were 
understood in the industry at the time of Liberty Mutual’s 
response, and we thus conclude that it did not breach the 
surety bond contract.  
                                              
14 Moreover, the bond required only a barebones demand for 
payment of a sum certain without any backup documentation.  
It makes little sense, then, to require the surety to reply with a 
detailed and exhaustive accounting. 
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Sloan.  Thus, the only remaining question is whether the term 
“expenses and costs” includes attorneys’ fees in addition to 
other litigation-related expenses and costs.  We believe that it 
does.  
 Sloan contends that if the parties had intended to 
provide for attorneys’ fees in Paragraph 20, they would have 
stated so explicitly.  Indeed, the “settled” law of Pennsylvania 
is that “attorneys[’] fees are recoverable from an adverse 
party to a cause only when provided for by statute, or when 
clearly agreed to by the parties.”  Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. 
Phila. Transp. Co., 173 A.2d 109, 113 (Pa. 1961).  The latter 
is our case; the parties were sufficiently explicit that 
attorneys’ fees and litigation costs were within the purview of 
the contract.  The most natural and likely meaning of 
“expenses and costs” in a paragraph discussing procedural 
mechanisms for lawsuits and other dispute resolution 
proceedings is that the term includes attorneys’ fees and not 
simply court and mediation costs.  See Wrenfield 
Homeowners Ass’n v. DeYoung, 600 A.2d 960 (Pa. 1991) 
(interpreting contractual agreement to pay the “costs of 
collecti[ng]” home-owner association assessments as 
including attorneys’ fees, given the broadness of that phrase 
and the reasonableness of that interpretation in context); 
Burrage v. Cnty. of Bristol, 210 Mass. 299, 300 (1911) 
(noting the “word ‘expenses’ [is] broad enough to include 
counsel fees” and whether it does depends on the context).15
                                              
15 Our holding is limited to Liberty Mutual’s right to expenses 
and costs (including attorneys’ fees) from Shoemaker’s case 
against IOC.  Because Liberty Mutual’s claim for attorneys’ 
fees was dismissed at summary judgment, without discovery 
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*    *    *    *   * 
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the 
District Court’s Final Judgment to the extent that it granted 
summary judgment to Sloan on (1) its interpretation of the 
subcontract and (2) Liberty Mutual’s claim for the 
proportional offset against Sloan of legal fees Shoemaker 
incurred in its suit again IOC; we affirm the Court’s denial of 
Sloan’s waiver claim (the subject of Sloan’s cross-appeal in 
this case); and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  Though the parties do not contest the stipulated 
amounts of the offsets in the Final Judgment, we leave to the 
District Court whether on remand they may argue those other 
offsets.  
 
                                                                                                     
regarding the amounts and reasonableness of those fees, we 
leave it to Liberty Mutual to prove that on remand.  However, 
because we limit Sloan’s claim to its pro rata share of the 
amount recovered so far, $300,000, we believe it reasonable 
for Liberty Mutual to offset Sloan’s claim, at most, by the 
appropriate pro rata share of that $300,000.  
 
